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Abstract
Data on rainfall patterns only weakly corroborate the claim that climate change explains the
Darfur conflict that began in 2003 and has claimed more than 200 000 lives and displaced more
than two million persons. Rainfall in Darfur did not decline significantly in the years prior to
the eruption of major conflict in 2003; rainfall exhibited a flat trend in the thirty years preceding
the conflict (1972–2002). The rainfall evidence suggests instead a break around 1971. Rainfall
is basically stationary over the pre- and post-1971 sub-periods. The break is larger for the more
northerly rainfall stations, and is less noticeable for En Nahud. Rainfall in Darfur did indeed
decline, but the decline happened over 30 years before the conflict erupted. Preliminary analysis
suggests little merit to the proposition that a structural break several decades earlier is a
reasonable predictor of the outbreak of large-scale civil conflict in Africa.
Keywords: climate, rainfall, Sahel, Sudan, Darfur, conflict
‘Darfur, at its core, is a conflict of insufficient rainfall’.
-Jeffrey Sachs
1. Introduction
The crisis in Darfur is one of the world’s most significant
conflicts. Since fighting began in earnest in 2003, the conflict
has forced over two million people to flee their villages
for the comparative safety of refugee camps and has led to
at least 200 000 excess deaths (United States Government
Accountability Office 2006). Influential voices such as those of
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, former Vice
President of the United States Al Gore, the United Nations
Environment Program, Columbia University professors Jeffrey
Sachs and Mahmood Mamdani, and popular commentators
including Stephan Faris writing in The Atlantic Monthly, have
recently asserted or implied that the Darfur civil war is a
climate crisis (Gore 2006, Sachs 2006, Faris 2007, Mamdani
2007a, 2007b, Moon 2007, United Nations Environment
Program 2007). The contention is that declining rainfall
and land degradation intensified violent struggles over water,
pasture and farmland culminating in a full-blown civil war
in 2003. The government of Sudan also has promoted this
narrative, attributing the conflict in Darfur to environmental
change. While non-environmental causes of the conflict are
noted, the thrust of this emerging narrative of the Darfur crisis
seems to be that if there had been more rain there would not
have been war and consequent human catastrophe.
Many of these commentaries link Darfur to broader
concerns about global climate change. The Stern report (2007)
on the economics of climate change, for example, argued
that the Darfur conflict resulted from the long periods of
drought during the 1970s and 1980s in Northern Darfur and
consequent breakdown in coping strategies. Giannini et al
(2003) demonstrated that rainfall decline in the Sahel was
partly attributable to changing ocean temperatures and that
changing ocean temperatures were partly the result of global
warming. It is easy to jump to the conclusion that Darfur
augurs a violent future for Sahelian Africa as global climate
change intensifies.
Careful attention should be paid to examining the
rainfall explanation of the emergence of violence in Darfur.
Commentators suggesting a climate change explanation for
the Darfur conflict rarely present data to validate their claims,
instead relying on a general understanding that Darfur is part
of the Sahel, an area where rainfall has been low, variable, and
in decline.
This paper makes two points through analysis of several
sources of data on rainfall in the Darfur region and African
countries more generally. The first point is that Darfur
1748-9326/08/034006+10$30.00 © 2008 IOP Publishing Ltd Printed in the UK1
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rainfall patterns only weakly corroborate the claim that climate
change explains the conflict. There is no evidence that a
short-term drought preceded the eruption of major conflict in
2003. Rainfall in Darfur did not decline significantly in the
years immediately prior to the crisis. Furthermore, short-term
but significant droughts in 1984 and 1990 did not provoke
wide-spread conflict. As for the assertion that long-term
rainfall decline has led to the crisis, there is no evidence of
a downwards trend. Instead, rainfall in Darfur exhibited a flat
trend, though with high variability, in the thirty years preceding
the conflict (1972–2002). There is, however, evidence of a
structural break to a lower level of rainfall in northern Darfur
in the early 1970s. So the claim that rainfall change caused the
conflict is a claim that a structural break thirty years prior to
the conflict was the cause of the conflict.
The second point is that structural breaks to lower mean
rainfall levels appear to be uncorrelated with subsequent
conflict in other countries in Africa. Other Sahelian African
countries have experienced similar breaks in their overall
average rainfall, yet levels of violence have been nowhere
near those of Darfur. Many African countries that have
not experienced structural declines in rainfall nevertheless
saw increased conflict over the past several decades. In
a multivariate estimation, measures of structural breaks in
rainfall are not significant in explaining the incidence of
conflict.
2. Data sources
Darfur, the westernmost province in Sudan, like most of arid
and semi-arid Africa, is marked by a good deal of climatic
variability. The region spans several environmental zones,
ranging from Saharan Desert in the far north of the province
to African Sahel and Savanna regions further south. Rainfall is
characterized by marked seasonality with a long dry season and
shorter wet season from June to October. Rainfall increases
from north to south, with Saharan regions receiving low and
intermittent rainfall, Sahelian regions ranging between 100 and
500 mm per year, and Savanna regions ranging from 500 to
1000 mm per year. The wet season exhibits much variability
within years, between years, and across short distances.
Large long-term fluctuations in climate are an inherent
feature of climate in Sahelian regions. Interdecadal and
interannual variability are the norm (Hulme 2001). Nicholson
(2001) finds that during the 1820s and 1830s dry conditions
prevailed with many lakes drying up. Rainfall then returned
to higher levels, but the first decades of the 20th century again
experienced low rainfall. Sahelian rainfall increased to high
levels during the 1930s–1960s. The late 1960s–1990s saw
lower rainfall (Foley et al 2003). The evidence of the 1990s and
2000s is of mean rainfall levels above the 1961–1990 average.
Indices of vegetative cover also suggest improvements in the
last decade of the 20th century (Prince et al 2007).
This paper makes use of three data sources with measures
of rainfall from Darfur and other relevant regions. The Climate
Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia provided
us with rainfall station records for Sudan for the period 1881–
2006. Since the early 1990s, rainfall station data for Darfur
appears to have been collected and reported only in the three
main towns of El Geneina, El Fasher, and Nyala. The Darfur
rainfall station data begins in 1917 for El Fasher, in 1928 for El
Geneina, and in 1920 for Nyala3. We also include the station
of En Nahud, in western Kordofan, the province neighboring
Darfur. Data from the rainfall stations is also available in
the Global Historical Climatology Network (GHCN-Monthly)
data base of the National Climatic Data Center of the US
Department of Commerce4. Complete GHCN data only go up
to 1992 for Sudan, and contain mostly missing variables after
that.
The second source is the rainfall dataset known as
GPCP Version 2 Combined Precipitation Data Set of the
Global Precipitation Climatology Project (hereafter GPCP), a
blending of estimates from satellite and rain gage measures
(Adler et al 2003). These precipitation estimates are available
for nodes of a 2.5◦ × 2.5◦ latitude–longitude global grid array.
The data start in 1979. The data for the Sahelian nodes were
obtained through an interactive website that enables users to
obtain time series from the GPCP5.
A third source is the historical monthly precipitation
dataset for global land areas from 1900 to 1998, gridded at
2.5◦ latitude by 3.75◦ longitude resolution, created by Hulme
et al (1998) for the Climate Research Unit of the University
of East Anglia6. This data uses various techniques to average
rainfall station data into grids. We use the four observations
for Darfur that are located at 12.5◦ latitude and 15◦ latitude
and 22.5◦ longitude and 26.25◦ longitude. The 12.5◦ latitude
measures lie roughly on the same latitude as En Nahud, but to
the west, in Darfur.
Figure 1 is a Google Earth image that shows the locations
of the rainfall stations, the GPCP nodes, and the Hulme nodes.
The three sources are highly correlated, but the GPCP and
Hulme series generally lie above the rainfall station series
(i.e., they have greater values for rainfall totals), presumably
because they are averaging rainfall data from both northern and
more southerly stations to impute rainfall to the nodes.
3. Short-term drought as a precipitating factor in the
Darfur conflict
Sachs (2005), writing in Scientific American, observed in
the context of a discussion of Darfur that ‘. . . studies have
shown that a temporary decline in rainfall has generally been
associated throughout sub-Saharan Africa with a marked rise in
the likelihood of violent conflict in the following months.’ He
was presumably referring to the work of Miguel et al (2004),
3 The CRU data appear to match a previously published chart of rainfall
patterns in El Fasher, El Geneina and Nyala in Teklu and Von Braun
(1991). Drought and Famine Relationships in Sudan: Policy Implications,
International Food Policy Research Institute and the rainfall pattern for El
Fasher presented in the report on Darfur by Tearfund (2007). Darfur: relief
in a vulnerable environment.
4 http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/ghcn-monthly/
5 http://disc2.nascom.nasa.gov/Giovanni/tovas/rain.GPCP.2.shtml
6
‘gu23wld0098.dat’ (Version 1.0) constructed and supplied by Dr Mike
Hulme at the Climatic Research Unit, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.
The work was supported by the UK Department of the Environment, Transport
and the Regions (Contract EPG 1/1/85). Downloaded from http://www.cru.
uea.ac.uk/∼mikeh/datasets/global/
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Figure 1. Approximate location of rainfall stations, Hulme nodes, and GPCP nodes, Darfur, Sudan.
who presented evidence from sub-Saharan African countries
showing that short-term declines in rainfall affected GDP and
that declines in GDP were associated with increased likelihood
of conflict. That is, the Miguel et al study used a measure of
rainfall change as an instrumental variable in estimating how
changes in GDP per capita might spark subsequent conflict.
The study was clear that only as rainfall changes were mediated
via incomes would there be a reasonable empirical basis for
linking rainfall to conflict (p 745): ‘While it is intuitively
plausible that the rainfall instruments are exogenous, they must
also satisfy the exclusion restriction: weather shocks should
affect civil conflict only through economic growth.’
The focus in the Miguel et al paper on how rainfall
affected income and how income affected conflict was an
indirect way to examine the more relevant relationships
between rainfall and consumption or rainfall and assets. A
population that experienced large swings in rainfall, from low
to high to low to high, might reasonably be expected to have
adapted to the fluctuations with savings mechanisms for storing
surplus from the good years so that consumption would not
decline in the bad years. Short-term decline in rainfall would
then be viewed by residents as a lamentable but normal part
of the ecosystem, and would not provoke large-scale violent
conflict. People would be richer were rainfall higher, but they
might not necessarily feel themselves to be impoverished were
rainfall to be low.
Unfortunately, good time series data on consumption and
assets are not available for the regions of most interest, namely
poor and conflict-prone countries in Africa. For Darfur,
there has been limited research on how robust livelihood
outcomes are to changes in rainfall. De Waal (1989), for
example, argued that Darfur populations were quite resilient
to extreme drought. Gray and Kevane (1993), took issue with
this characterization for neighboring central Kordofan, finding
villagers rapidly losing assets following the drought of 1990.
Parallel research in Sahelian West Africa has been assessing
the adaptive capacity to drought conditions (Mortimore 1989,
Mortimore and Adams 2001, Raynaut 2001), concluding
that Sahelian populations are far more adapted in terms of
maintaining incomes and livelihoods than many commentators
had imagined. Reardon et al (1988) noted some time ago
the paradox that populations in more northerly Sahelian
ecosystems in Burkina Faso, where average rainfall was low
and variability high, experienced more stable incomes in the
event of droughts than more southerly Sahelian populations.
In any case, rainfall data shows no evidence of short-
term decline below normal rainfall in Darfur preceding the
conflict. The years leading up to the crisis are not out of
the norm of variability for the thirty year period prior to the
crisis. Figure 2 shows data for the period 1972–2002 for
the four rainfall stations relevant to the situation in Darfur
(El Geneina, El Fasher, Nyala and En Nahud). The final
data point before the outbreak of heavy conflict, 2002, shows
rainfall close to the 30 year mean levels for all four stations.
Figure 3 shows data for the four locations in Darfur that are
nodes for the rainfall estimates of the Global Precipitation
Climatology Project (GPCP). These charts also show no
significant decline leading up to the conflict of 2003. Both
3
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Figure 2. Rainfall at four rain stations in Darfur area (annual mm), 1972–2002 (dashed lines are mean rainfall for period).
Figure 3. Rainfall at four latitude–longitude nodes in Darfur (annual mm), 1979–2002 (dashed lines are mean rainfall for period).
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Figure 4. Distribution of monthly rainfall in Darfur in 1984, 1990 and 2002.
the rainfall station data and GPCP data map the substantial
declines in 1984 and 1990. These declines did not provoke
large-scale conflict, even though they generated considerable
population displacement. Figure 4 presents the distribution of
monthly rainfall for the four GPCP nodes, comparing 2002,
the rainy season that preceded the large-scale conflict that
erupted in the dry season of early 2003, to the drought years
of 1984 and 1990. Rainfall was comparatively high in 2002
and evenly distributed, suggesting that if there was a proximate
drought event that could have triggered a large-scale outbreak
of violence, it would have been in 1984 or 1990.
The evident lack of a linear trend in the 30 year period
1972–2002 for the rainfall station data and the 23 year period
1979–2002 for the GPCP data is not an artifact of the starting
date. Indeed, because of the serious drought of 1984, if the
starting year for estimating a trend is in the early 1980s then
trend rainfall has been upwards over the 20 year period 1982–
2002. For all ten starting dates over the period 1965–1974 and
for all four rainfall stations, the estimated coefficient on the
variable for year is not statistically significant at the 5% level in
a regression explaining rainfall totals over 30 year periods, with
only two exceptions for 1965 and 1966 in Nyala. A similar
result obtains for the GPCP data when estimating a linear trend
for each span of years ending in 2002 and starting with 1979
and continuing through 1988. The coefficients on the variable
measuring the year are not significant, with only one exception.
(These results are available upon request.)
The rainfall data thus suggest there was no short-term
decline below normal rainfall that precipitated the conflict of
2003. Neither was there any statistically significant trend
decline in rainfall for the thirty year period prior to the outbreak
of the conflict. As the section 4 will make clear, to make the
claim that change in rainfall caused the conflict one would have
to go back more than thirty years prior to the outbreak of the
conflict to find a meaningful change in rainfall.
4. Long-term rainfall: trend decline or structural
break?
At one time it was thought that rainfall in Darfur was declining
rapidly (Eldredge et al 1988). As seen above, there was no
trend in rainfall in Darfur for the thirty year period 1972–
2002. For longer periods of time, say 50 year periods, there
is however considerable evidence of a decline7. Table 1
reports the coefficients on the variable measuring the year
in regressions explaining annual rainfall totals for various 50
year periods, starting in 1942. Since the starting date used in
estimating a trend might generate a spurious trend (if the start
date was an outlier year of high rainfall), we estimate the trend
coefficient for every start date. Each time period is 50 years or,
7 Although data for rainfall stations do go back to the 1920s, the purpose
here is to examine how changes in rainfall might have caused the outbreak of
major conflict in Darfur in 2003. We believe there is little value in examining
how rainfall patterns were different in the 1920s and 1930s (or the 1940–1970
period, for that matter) in explaining the outbreak of conflict in 2003.
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Table 1. Estimates of trend in rainfall station data, for fifty year
periods, with various start years. (Note: for years after 1952, trend is
calculated for time period ending in 2002. Source: Sudan rain station
data provided by David Lister, Climatic Research Unit, University of
East Anglia.)
Period Nyala El Geneina En Nahud El Fasher
1942–1992 −3.54a −5.50a −2.84a −3.87a
1943–1993 −3.78a −5.86a −2.78a −3.90a
1944–1994 −3.88a −6.01a −2.81a −4.11a
1945–1995 −3.68a −5.70a −2.38a −3.57a
1946–1996 −3.53a −4.73a −1.77 −3.43a
1947–1997 −3.63a −4.75a −1.65 −3.90a
1948–1998 −3.95a −4.74a −1.52 −4.19a
1949–1999 −4.19a −5.06a −1.52 −4.00a
1950–2000 −3.61a −4.89a −1.37 −3.05a
1951–2001 −3.16a −5.24a −1.54 −3.04a
1952–2002 −3.51a −4.53a −1.53 −3.08a
1953–2002 −3.51a −4.47a −0.64 −2.75a
1954–2002 −3.42a −3.89a −0.73 −1.80a
1955–2002 −3.19a −3.46a −0.87 −1.85a
1956–2002 −2.91a −3.12a −0.60 −1.71a
1957–2002 −2.85a −3.14a −0.28 −1.79a
1958–2002 −2.76a −3.22a −0.11 −1.89a
1959–2002 −2.71a −3.47a 0.01 −1.65
1960–2002 −2.78a −3.36 0.45 −1.51
1961–2002 −2.74a −2.58 0.31 −1.48
1962–2002 −2.73a −2.21 0.63 −1.14
1963–2002 −1.98 −1.25 0.44 −0.94
1964–2002 −1.09 −0.03 1.07 −0.63
a Indicates trend coefficient is statistically significant with
p-value of 0.05 or lower.
for those where 50 years would go beyond 2002 (the end date
of interest), the number of years included in the time period is
2002 minus the starting year.
All of the rainfall stations except En Nahud exhibit strong
negative trend declines when starting the time period in the
1940s or 1950s, years of high rainfall. Note that the coefficients
on the variable measuring year get smaller as the datasets for
which the trend is estimated start later. By the early 1960s,
none of the rainfall stations have statistically significant trends,
and this continues through the late 1960s as noted above. The
downwards trend over the long dure´e is also apparent using the
Hulme 2.5◦ × 3.75◦ dataset. The node located at 12.5◦ latitude
and 26.25◦ longitude is approximately 150 km to the southeast
of El Fasher; the other node is closer to El Geneina at 12.5◦
latitude and 22.5◦ longitude. The slopes of the rainfall trends
for these nodes are declines of 3.7 mm and 2.6 mm per year,
respectively, for the 1940–2002 period.
The notion of gradual trend decline in Darfur, however,
is misleading. Figure 5 shows the rainfall levels measured at
the various rain stations for the period 1940–2002, with the
mean levels of rainfall for the two time periods, 1940–1972
and 1972–2002. What seems to have happened to rainfall in
El Fasher and other Darfur locations is a break around the late
1960s and early 1970s in the basically stationary time series
of rainfall. For the period 1940–1972, rainfall in the four
rainfall stations fluctuated around a stable mean, and for the
period 1972–2002 rainfall again fluctuated around a stable but
lower mean. The variance of rainfall was the same for both
time periods for three of rainfall stations, but not for El Fasher,
where the variance was somewhat smaller for the more recent
period. If the two time periods, 1940–1972 and 1972–2002,
are considered separately, simple regression analysis indicates
no statistically significant trend for either time period for any
of the four rainfall stations. Very similar patterns emerge when
only looking at July–August–September rainfall totals, when
looking at the length in months of the rainy season (i.e. how
many continuous months of decent rainfall) and the beginning
month of the season (what was the first month in a two-month
period of decent rainfall). These measures are robust to the
cutoffs in what constitutes decent rainfall.
We estimated trend and break regressions for the two
Hulme nodes that are in central Darfur and for the four rainfall
stations (the GPCP series only begins in 1979 and so cannot
be used for this analysis). One regression estimates a linear
trend for the period 1940–2002, the other estimates rainfall
using a simple dummy variable taking on the value 1 for years
after 1971 and 0 otherwise. For the four rainfall stations, the
R-square is higher for the simple break in intercept model,
by a large amount (the R-square coefficients for the trend
regressions are around 0.12, for the break models they are
around 0.24). For the Hulme data the break model also
provides a better fit, though the difference in R-square is more
modest (from 0.26 to 0.33).
In order to determine the timing of the structural break for
the relevant Darfur nodes, we run the non-parametric test of
Pettitt (1979). The test statistic is given by the maximum value
of |Ut | for all time periods in the data, and where,
Ut = 2
t∑
1
(Ranki ) − t (T + 1).
That is, the rainfall totals are ranked, and then for a possible
break year t (counting from the first period) the sum of ranks
of rainfall totals in periods (years) before the break year is
calculated, and from this is subtracted the break period times
T + 1 where T is the total number of periods. A break in
the series is statistically significant if the statistic is larger
than the appropriate cutoff from the distribution under the null
hypothesis of no break or change. The possible break year, or
change point, is the year with the largest absolute value of Ut .
Table 2 presents the results for the rainfall station data.
Breaks in rainfall to lower mean rainfall occurred in 1971 for
El Fasher, and around that year for the other rainfall stations
and Hulme nodes. Given that the break points are very close
to 1971, we calculate the mean rainfall for all stations for the
1940–1971 and 1972–2002 periods. The drops in mean rainfall
are quite large: about 100 mm for the Darfur rainfall stations,
and 40 mm for En Nahud. The findings are similar to other
studies. Mahe et al (2001), for example, find a change point
around 1970 for Sahelian rainfall in West Africa.
To summarize the analysis of longer-term data, the
characterization of rainfall in Darfur as ‘declining’, with the
implication of rainfall getting lower and lower, fluctuating
around a declining mean, is misleading. The rainfall evidence
suggests instead a break around 1971. Rainfall is basically
stationary over the pre- and post-1971 sub-periods. The break
is larger for the more northerly rainfall stations, and is less
noticeable for En Nahud. Rainfall in Darfur did indeed decline,
6
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Figure 5. Rainfall at four rain stations in Darfur area (annual mm), 1940–2002 (dashed lines are means for 1940–1971 and 1972–2002).
Table 2. Pettitt test for change point in series of Darfur rainfall annual totals. (Sources: Sudan rain station data provided by David Lister,
Climatic Research Unit, University of East Anglia, Hulme data is gu23wld0098.dat (Version 1.0), provided by Mike Hulme, Climatic
Research Unit, University of East Anglia; tests use observations 1940–2002.)
Rainfall station
Value
Uk
Critical
K
Year of
break
Mean rainfall
before 1971
Mean rainfall
after 1971
SD before
break
SD after
break
El Geneina 621 373 1971 553 403 124 120
El Fasher 675 365 1971 286 191 104 68
Nyala 562 356 1970 459 362 95 89
En Nahud 465 373 1965 398 361 94 100
Hulme 2.5 × 3.75
Lat 15, long 22.5 579 315 1964 475 352 141 95
Lat 15, long 26.25 415 315 1968 314 238 91 74
Lat 12.5, long 22.5 615 315 1970 631 488 108 96
Lat 12.5, long 26.25 577 315 1970 422 325 71 71
but the decline happened over 30 years before the conflict
erupted.
5. Structural shifts in rainfall as explanation of
conflict in sub-Saharan Africa
We turn now to consider whether structural shifts generally
have been associated with increased outbreaks of conflict.
Mamdani (2007a, 2007b), for instance, asserted that the
drought in the 1970s in Darfur led to a situation where ‘co-
operation turned into an intense struggle over diminishing
resources’.
Figure 6 uses the Hulme dataset to present the average
rainfall at the country level (taking the simple average of all
nodes that lie in the country) for various countries and suggests
that other Sahelian countries experienced structural declines in
the early 1970s. Given the relative absence of civil conflict in
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, perhaps the structural decline in
rainfall explains very little of the Darfur conflict.
We conducted an exercise to increase the sample size and
use an agreed-upon measure of civil conflict. We calculated
the break or change year in rainfall totals for every country in
sub-Saharan Africa, using the Hulme dataset, for time period
1940–1998. The country rainfall totals were simple averages of
7
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Figure 6. Rainfall in six Sahelian countries, 1940–1998 (dashed lines indicate means levels for 1940–1971 and 1972–1998).
all nodes falling with the country borders. We dropped nodes
where more than 10 observations were missing for the time
period. Six small countries that did not encompass a node were
included, with the rainfall totals calculated from the nearest
relevant nodes. The Pettitt test was used to determine the break
year. For each country with a break year identified by the
Pettitt test, we calculated the magnitude of the structural break
as the difference between mean rainfall for the time period
before the break and mean rainfall for the time period after the
break. We then used the Miguel et al dataset of civil conflicts
to note any possible effects of a structural decline in rainfall on
civil conflict. We calculated the number of years of conflict
in the decades of the 1980s and the 1990s (any conflict as
measured by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), serious
war as measured by PRIO, and the Collier war measure as used
in Miguel et al and which are drawn from the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset8).
The results are in table 3. Twenty-two of thirty-
eight countries experienced structural breaks. All of the
Sahelian/West African countries saw structural breaks, and
all except Ethiopia were in the 1967–74 period. Few of the
southern, eastern and central African countries experienced
breaks, and the break for Somalia was positive. The
table makes clear that there was no obvious relationship
between structural breaks and resulting conflict decades later.
8 http://new.prio.no/CSCW-Datasets/Data-on-Armed-Conflict/
UppsalaPRIO-Armed-Conflicts-Dataset/
Of seventeen Sahelian/West African countries experiencing
structural breaks, only three saw extended conflict during the
1980s. The same three (Ethiopia, Chad and Sudan) continued
with conflict in the 1990s, and were joined by a number of
others. Country experts would be unlikely to ascribe those
other conflicts to declines in rainfall (e.g. Burkina Faso’s short
war with Mali and modestly bloody coup d’e´tat). For the non-
Sahelian countries, there was a mix of cases of extended war
and structural break. No pattern is evident. Crosstabs and
multiple regression analysis of various measures of war against
the presence or absence of a structural break suggest no pattern.
Preliminary analysis, then, suggests little merit to the
proposition that a structural break several decades earlier is
a reasonable predictor of the outbreak of large-scale civil
conflict. Too many other factors are at play.
6. Conclusion
We have considered and rejected the argument that Darfur’s
conflict is best thought of as a climate change conflict. There
was no change in rainfall as a short-term trigger to the conflict.
There is no evident cross-country pattern in the correlations
between structural breaks in rainfall and incidence of conflict
in later decades. The two points of this paper, that the proper
characterization of rainfall in Darfur is of a structural break in
around 1971, with stationary rainfall after that, and that there is
no correlation in African countries between structural breaks in
8
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Table 3. Structural breaks in rainfall and incidence of large-scale civil conflict (years during decade when country in conflict). (Note: source:
Rainfall data from gu23wld0098.dat (Version 1.0), provided by Mike Hulme, Climatic Research Unit, University of East Anglia; conflict data
from Miguel et al (2004), who in turn use various sources cited in their paper.)
Country
Year of
break
Difference
between pre-and
post-break mean
rainfall (mm)
Years of war
(PRIO)
1980s years
any civil
conflict
(PRIO)
Years of
war
(Collier)
Years of
war
(PRIO)
1990s years
any civil
conflict
(PRIO)
Years of
war
(Collier)
Sahel/West Africa
Gambia, The 1967 259 0 1 0 0 0 0
Guinea-Bissau 1967 342 0 0 0 1 2 0
Mali 1967 97 0 0 0 0 2 0
Niger 1967 54 0 0 0 0 6 0
Sudan 1967 65 7 7 7 7 9 9
Benin 1969 108 0 0 0 0 0 0
Burkina Faso 1969 137 0 1 0 1 2 0
Cote d’Ivoire 1969 190 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guinea 1969 378 0 0 0 1 2 0
Mauritania 1969 46 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senegal 1969 199 0 0 0 1 7 0
Chad 1970 76 8 9 8 3 8 0
Liberia 1970 564 0 1 1 1 2 2
Sierra Leone 1970 508 0 0 0 2 9 9
Ghana 1974 183 0 2 0 0 0 0
Togo 1974 146 0 1 0 0 1 0
Ethiopia 1977 138 9 9 9 2 6 2
Other
Angola 9 9 9 8 10 10
Burundi 0 0 1 1 8 9
Congo, Dem. R. 9 9 0 2 3 8
Congo, Rep. 0 0 0 3 3 3
Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kenya 0 1 0 0 0 0
Lesotho 0 0 0 0 1 0
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mozambique 9 9 9 3 3 3
Rwanda 0 0 0 5 9 5
South Africa 9 9 0 4 4 0
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tanzania 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uganda 9 9 8 3 8 0
Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zimbabwe 0 0 0 2 2 0
Somalia 1959 −73 1 9 8 2 2 2
Central Afric. R. 1969 121 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nigeria 1969 114 0 0 4 0 0 0
Cameroon 1971 102 0 1 0 0 0 0
Botswana 1978 89 0 0 0 0 0 0
rainfall and subsequent conflict, would seem to cast doubt on
the applicability of an explanation for the conflict in Darfur as
due to rainfall change.
Casting doubt is not the same as ruling out. It is
certainly possible that a structural break to a lower level of
rainfall in Darfur in the 1970s led to disruption or decline
in the livelihoods of those poorer Darfurians at the median
or lower quintiles of the income and asset distribution. We
contend, however, that there is little systematic evidence that
the structural break in rainfall led to a downwards spiral
for large fractions of the Darfur population. There is much
evidence that Sahelian societies have coped with semi-arid
conditions of low rainfall with high variability, both temporally
and spatially (Mortimore 1989). These environments are
tough for humans, but most regions see evolving strategies
such as income diversification, agricultural intensification and
migration, rather than large-scale violence. Moreover, some
recent studies of satellite imagery of vegetation over the past
twenty-five years have found a greening trend in Sahelian
Africa, including Darfur, suggesting that farmers, herders and
regional ecosystems have not been in a downwards spiral
of lower biomass production (Eklundh and Olsson 2003,
Sjo¨stro¨m 2004, Herrmann et al 2005, Olsson et al 2005).
This does not mean that life in Sahelian Africa with low
rainfall is an idyll: there are endemic low-level struggles
over resources, particularly between herders and farmers.
But generally conflict does not erupt into warfare because
regional institutions and central governments have projected
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their authority into Sahelian hinterlands and curbed violent
situations before they have intensified. Sahelian West Africa,
for example, has seen no outbreak of larger-scale conflict
because governance institutions function reasonably well in
terms of preventing local conflicts from becoming scorched-
earth campaigns such as that seen in Darfur.
Other Sahelian sub-regions that have developed wide-
spread conflict on the scale of Darfur, such as the long-lasting
civil conflicts in Chad and the various wars in Ethiopia and
Eritrea, are only implausibly linked to climate change. What
makes Darfur different from West Africa and similar to Chad,
Ethiopia and Eritrea? The answer is straightforward: an elite
ruling the country from the capital that has preferred to exclude
peripheral populations from genuine participation in political
processes and has repeatedly revealed a willingness and ability
to use large-scale violence, often against civilian populations,
in response to perceived threats from the peripheral regions.
In Sudan, this willingness to use large-scale indiscriminate
violence was evident in the civil wars encompassing Southern
Sudan and the Nuba Mountains (Johnson 2003). Individuals
who constitute the present military regime in Sudan are
being indicted or are being considered for indictment by the
International Criminal Court, and the defense that they were
reluctantly embroiled in a local conflict induced by climate
change has little merit.
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